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THE SIGN, offers a first-hand perspective from inside one of NATO’s most important emerging conversations. Drawing on her experience at the 2026 NATO Space Centre of Excellence Conference in Toulouse, she explores how space has transformed from a supporting domain into a central arena of security, resilience, and geopolitical competition.
Blending personal insight with strategic analysis, this article reveals why the future of defense will be shaped not only in orbit, but in the invisible architecture of cyber and space systems that underpin modern society.
May 8, 2026
“Space is no longer a distant domain” – it is now embedded in the daily mechanics of defense, infrastructure, and geopolitical competition. In Ukraine, we knew it from day zero of the full-scale invasion in 2022 and the Viasat hacking. That’s why THE SIGN was created – to contribute to what was at that moment a small ecosystem of space cybersecurity experts who knew how to resist a global adversary.
We had the honor of being invited to the NATO Space Centre of Excellence Conference, “From Awareness to Action: Embedding Space in NATO Operations,” held from 27 to 29 April 2026 in Toulouse, France. This year’s theme emphasized the increasing significance of space in defense, resilience and multinational coordination.
This was not about rockets – it’s about power.
There were 15 flags on stage, among the 32 partnering NATO countries, representatives of the NATO Space COE Sponsoring Nations, a spirit of partnership and brotherhood in the air, and a lot of testosterone. I think I was the only Ukrainian among 500 participants. But at the end of the day, I didn’t need to see the flag of my country serving for four years in a row (actually, twelve since 2014 international law violation) as a shield for Europe and Western civilization. I heard “Ukraine” in every keynote speech, in every conversation. No one is doubting that Ukraine today is the most advanced and skilled kinetic and cyber army in the world leading the drone warfare industry.
But more than that, being at this NATO Space COE gathering, I saw a clear difference between showmakers and the silent builders of the future security of Europe.
More than that I saw what a real partnership beyond politics looks like.
Just like my wise friend taught me three life rules:
The NATO Space Centre of Excellence, host of this second annual conference, is itself a product of a very recent shift. Until 2019, NATO did not formally treat space as a domain of operations. Space capabilities existed, but only through national contributions, without a unified strategic framework. That changed in June 2019, when NATO adopted its first Overarching Space Policy and officially recognized space as a fifth operational domain, alongside land, air, sea, and cyber.
This was not a technological breakthrough – it was a conceptual one. NATO moved from using space to thinking strategically about space.
From there, the evolution accelerated. Between 2020 and 2021, NATO began translating policy into deterrence logic. The establishment of the Space Operations Centre in Ramstein and the 2021 Brussels Summit declaration – that attacks “to, from, or within space” could trigger Article 5 – marked a turning point. Space became part of collective defense.
Then came the real-world test. In 2022, on the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Viasat cyberattack disrupted satellite communications across Europe. The response across NATO and partner nations triggered a deeper institutional shift: accelerated investment in resilience, recognition of commercial actors as critical infrastructure and a renewed urgency around space domain awareness.
Additionally to that:
- Anti-satellite tests of China and India
- Risk of silent escalation
- Dual-use dilemma: Commercial satellites = civilian tools + military assets
- Private companies now sit inside geopolitical conflict
Between 2022 and 2024, NATO moved into capability building. Efforts focused on tracking threats, protecting satellite services, and integrating data across allies.
The launch of the Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) initiative in 2024 reflected this shift – a multinational effort to share intelligence and build a common operational picture.
“What happens in space doesn’t stay in space”
But it also revealed a structural reality: NATO does not own most space assets. It must coordinate them across nations and increasingly across private companies.
By 2025, that reality was formalized in NATO’s Commercial Space Strategy. What had already been visible in Ukraine became doctrine: private companies are now part of the battlespace. Space strategy expanded beyond governments into a broader ecosystem of dual-use technologies and public-private collaboration.
And that brings us to 2026 to Toulouse.
Toulouse is Europe’s aerospace capital, home to Airbus, major space industry players, and a dense ecosystem linking civil, commercial and defense space. It is also where the NATO Space COE is collocated on the same Air Base with the French Space Command.
The Space COE itself is a relatively new institution within NATO’s ecosystem, established in the mid-2020s as Allies recognised the need for a dedicated hub to integrate space into multi-domain operations. Its foundation reflects the broader post-2019 evolution of NATO’s space posture, moving from policy recognition toward operational implementation.
On 19 January 2026, the NATO Space Centre of Excellence reached a historic milestone with the declaration of its Final Operational Capability (FOC). This achievement confirms that the Centre has fully developed its structure, resources, and expertise to deliver its mission at full scale.
Holding the conference in Toulouse is a statement: Europe’s space future is being built at the intersection of industry, military and multinational cooperation.
This is only the second edition of the conference, which matters. The format is still evolving, but its purpose is already clear: to move from alignment to execution.
Throughout the conference, this shift was unpacked across three key areas:
- Escalation Management and Effective Deterrence in Space
- Operationalising Space in a Multi-Domain Context: Maximising Effects Through Integration
- Integrating Capabilities in Space: Dual-Use Solutions and Challenges
These were not theoretical discussions. High-level participants engaged in keynotes and panels focused on real constraints: attribution, resilience, escalation and integration. Alongside them, industry is present, not as observers, but as actors, showcasing technologies that already shape the operational environment.
And even the presence of the media reflects that shift. The formal press invitation signals something important: this conversation is becoming more visible and more strategic in how it is communicated. That means that allies are confident and aligned. For me as a Ukrainian that means a world.
“The world as we have known it for the last 70 years is gone.”
“Events have completely abandoned traditional roles.”
“If our actions are not shaping the adversary’s next decision… we are simply reacting.”
“We cannot fail in adapting to a course of history that has radically changed.”
“We must evolve from merely seeing objects in space to truly understanding the domain in real time.”
“We are moving to a NATO 3.0.”
“Norms alone will not deter a capable and determined adversary.”
“Deterrence is not a game. It’s a function of capability, credibility and communication.”
“Resilience must remain a foundational investment.”
“We need systems that can absorb shock and continue to operate.”
At the NATO Space COE, doctrine is being rewritten in real time as space becomes a contested operational domain. As one speaker noted, “space is no longer a sanctuary. It is a battlefield.” This shift is not abstract. It reflects a structural transformation in how allies understand deterrence, resilience and collective defence.
The Centre’s current mission sits firmly within this transition. It is building the intellectual and operational foundations for a domain where, as was emphasized, “space is no longer just a supporting function. Space is central and critical to our way of life and our reality.” This means moving beyond legacy concepts of space support and toward integrated multi-domain operations where space is embedded in every layer of planning and execution.
A core pillar of this evolution is Space Domain Awareness (SDA). As highlighted in the discussions, deterrence collapses without clarity: “Without the ability to attribute, there is no deterrence.”
The ability to understand not just what is happening in orbit, but why it is happening – behavior, intent and consequence – is operationally decisive. This requires persistent sensing, fused intelligence, and real-time interpretation of a domain deliberately shaped by ambiguity.
Closely linked is the emerging concept of “space warning time,” described as the ability to generate “immediate unambiguous warning of an attack on our space assets,” comparable in strategic weight to Cold War missile warning systems. This is the foundation of crisis stability in orbit. The shorter the warning gap, the higher the risk of miscalculation. The longer and more reliable it becomes, the stronger deterrence holds.
As articulated in the dialogue, “the fastest and most credible deterrent will come from a multinational shared early warning system for space.” This reflects a shift from national silos to collective awareness, and from fragile systems to proliferated, adaptive constellations.
Yet none of this is sustainable without people. Across the NATO space ecosystem, there is a growing recognition that capability is ultimately a function of talent. The ability to outpace emerging threats depends not only on technology, but on shared investment in human capital across nations and institutions.
This means building interoperable expertise, joint training pipelines and continuous exchange between military, civil and industrial space communities. In this sense, collaboration extends to skills, knowledge, and leadership development.
As was implicitly reflected throughout the discussions, strategic alignment is also educational alignment: a common operational picture requires a common intellectual foundation. That is a total match to THE SIGN’s mission.
The future of Space 2040 therefore depends on cultivating a new generation of space professionals with shared human values who can move seamlessly between policy, operations, engineering and intelligence across institutions and national commands.
Ultimately, Space 2040 is about stability through credibility. It is about ensuring that adversaries cannot act in ambiguity, that allies can act in unity and that institutions can grow together in capability and talent. In this emerging doctrine, space is the centre of gravity.
If the conference in Toulouse made one thing unmistakably clear, it is this: the future of space security is decided as much in code as in orbit.
Today, more than 10,000 active satellites underpin everything from missile warning systems and battlefield communications to banking transactions and energy grids. By 2030, that number is expected to exceed 50,000, driven largely by commercial mega-constellations. Every additional satellite is not just an asset – it is also an attack surface.
What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its partners are facing is a live, contested domain where cyber operations can disrupt, degrade or manipulate space-based capabilities without a single piece of debris being created.
This is the core of the geopolitical shift: space is defined by connectivity.
In this reality, deterrence is about:
- the ability to detect and attribute cyber interference in real time
- the resilience of systems to absorb and recover from digital disruption
- and the credibility to respond across domains – space, cyber, terrestrial, maritime – simultaneously
Geopolitically, this creates a new layer of competition. State actors like China and Russia are investing heavily in counter-space and cyber capabilities designed to exploit ambiguity and asymmetry. At the same time, private companies – many headquartered in allied nations – operate a significant portion of the infrastructure now considered mission-critical. This blurs the line between civilian and military targets, raising unresolved questions about escalation, proportionality, and collective defense.
From an impact perspective, the stakes are systemic:
- A disruption in satellite navigation can affect aviation, shipping, and military precision operations
- Compromised Earth observation data can distort intelligence and decision-making
- Attacks on communication satellites can sever command-and-control structures in real time
In other words, space cybersecurity is a foundational layer of national security and resilience.
What Toulouse ultimately revealed is that the race is no longer just to dominate space but to secure it, understand it, and defend it as a living, interconnected system.
And in that system, the strongest actors will not be those who simply launch the most satellites, but those who can protect, adapt, and respond faster than the threats evolve.
Because in the space domain of 2040, superiority will not be measured by presence alone.
It will be measured by resilience under attack.
Author: Tatiana Skydan, Co-Founder & Editor-In-Chief at THE SIGN.MEDIA
Photo credit: NATO Space Centre of Excellence
THE SIGN.MEDIA would like to express its sincere gratitude to Colonel Sylvain Debarre, Director of the NATO Space Centre of Excellence, and Emilie Lautier, Public Information Officer, for their warm welcome, exemplary professionalism, and gracious hospitality.
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